



Lebanon Situation Report

February 21, 2025

Background

Anera's last [Situation Report \(January 2025\)](#) summarizes the situation immediately after the ceasefire announcement and ongoing tensions and hostilities.

Overview

Under the initial ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Hezbollah in November, Israel was expected to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon by January 26. However, Israel has refused to withdraw, and the deadline has been extended to February 18. Despite the ceasefire, Israel continues to carry out sporadic airstrikes in Lebanon. This ongoing military presence prevents thousands from returning to their homes in border villages, with Israeli forces reportedly firing at those who approach too closely.¹ Recent reports show that Israel is requesting an additional extension for the withdrawal of its troops from southern Lebanon.²

OCHA reported that humanitarian actors continue to face considerable challenges in accessing areas where Israeli warnings remain in place, including over 60 villages and towns in southern Lebanon. Many villages near the border remain uninhabited due to ongoing insecurity. Following the formal cessation of hostilities, Civil Defense teams are recovering bodies in areas such as Khiam, Alma Shaab, Naqoura, Bayada, and Tayr Harfa — regions that were previously inaccessible at the height of Israeli attacks. OCHA highlighted that the most pressing humanitarian needs are for shelter, food, water storage, solar lamps, and winterization assistance. Beyond immediate relief, there is an increasing demand for hospitalization and advanced medical care. This also includes a growing need for mental health and psychosocial support services, as well as specialized care for persons with disabilities.³

Israel's indiscriminate bombardment has severely impacted heritage buildings in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, central Beirut, and Beirut's southern suburbs, causing widespread destruction. This damage extends beyond well-known ancient ruins to lesser-known sites and local treasures. According to archeologist and journalist Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly, the worst destruction has been to private properties,

¹ [Here's how Israel is repeatedly violating the Lebanon ceasefire, February 2025 | AlJazeera](#)

² [Israel seeks another extension for Lebanon withdrawal, source says, February 2025 | BBC](#)

³ [Lebanon: Flash Update #55 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 16 January 2025 | OCHA](#)

particularly historic 200-year-old homes. Baalbek, a city in the Bekaa Valley known for its remarkably well-preserved Roman temples, was heavily affected by Israeli airstrikes. While the ruins were not directly hit, they are covered in debris, and one wall has been partially destroyed. The smoke, white phosphorus, and vibrations from the explosions may have caused irreversible damage. Tyre's smaller heritage sites were reduced to rubble. Israeli forces destroyed at least three churches in southern Lebanon, including the Melkite Greek Catholic Church on October 9. Bombs also hit cemeteries, Crusader-built fortresses, fishing ports, and historical markets.⁴

Violence in Lebanon

Military activity persists in various regions of Lebanon, particularly in southern areas where the Israeli Army reiterated its restrictions on civilian presence. These ongoing restrictions have further complicated the return of populations, obstructed access to humanitarian aid and recovery initiatives, and undermined civilian protection efforts. Although Israeli forces were reported to have withdrawn from certain villages, military operations, including artillery bombardments, airstrikes, and the demolition and detonation of homes and civilian infrastructure in border areas, persisted. Additionally, the detention of farmers continued, with these actions reportedly resulting in civilian casualties.⁵

On February 8, an Israeli air raid in eastern Lebanon killed six people and wounded two. The attack, carried out by a drone, targeted the Shaara area near the town of Jennata in the eastern Bekaa region.⁶ On January 31, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) issued a statement confirming that an Israeli raid on Janta-Baqa resulted in two fatalities and ten injuries.⁷ On January 27, MoPH released the total toll of Israeli attacks from the previous day, when citizens attempted to return to their towns still occupied by Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. The attacks resulted in 24 deaths, including six women, and 134 injuries, among them 14 women and 12 children.⁸

Shelter & Displacement

As of February 5, Lebanon has recorded 98,986 internally displaced persons (IDPs). These IDPs have sought refuge in 344 cadasters across all eight governorates, with displacement reported in 24 districts. Most IDPs (92%) originate from five districts: 45% from Bent Jbeil, 19% from Sour, 11% from Marjaayoun, 10% from El Nabatieh, and 7% from Baabda. The remaining 8% come from nine other districts. Lebanon has also

⁴ [Lebanon's Cultural Heritage: A Casualty of War with Israel. February 2025 | Wilson Center](#)

⁵ [Lebanon: Flash Update #56 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 23 January 2025 | OCHA](#)

⁶ [Israeli air strike kills six in eastern Lebanon amid fragile ceasefire, February 2025 | AlJazeera](#)

⁷ [Lebanese Ministry of Public Health | Facebook](#)

⁸ [The final outcome of the Israeli enemy's attacks yesterday, January 2025 | MoPH](#)

recorded 890,830 returned IDPs. The highest return numbers are in El Nabatieh governorate, with 248,360 individuals (28%), followed by Sour district in the South governorate (185,806 or 21%) and Baalbek district in Baalbek-El Hermel (149,629 or 17%). All 410,238 IDPs who fled Beirut relocated outside the city before returning. Similarly, nearly all 321,713 returned IDPs from El Nabatieh had been displaced elsewhere. Currently, 31% of IDPs are staying with host families, 65% are renting housing, 2% are in 33 collective sites, and 2% have moved to secondary residences. Less than 1% live in unfinished buildings, tents, streets, or self-settled sites. Among those in host settings, 16,710 share homes with non-displaced families, while 13,679 live separately. Notably, 36% of the 30,389 individuals in host settings are living in overcrowded conditions.⁹

A total of 90,076 buildings sustained damage due to the aggressions on Lebanon, with 66,587 partially affected and 23,489 completely destroyed. Housing was severely affected, with 59,577 units damaged, 29% of which were completely destroyed. Additionally, 989 infrastructure and essential service assets were damaged, including schools, healthcare centers, roads, utilities, telecommunications, water and wastewater systems, agricultural roads, private generators, solar projects, waste management sites, municipal buildings, markets, and public facilities such as gas stations and sports centers.¹⁰

The destruction of homes by Israeli forces continues, particularly in the Bint Jbeil and Marjaayoun districts in the Nabatieh Governorate.¹¹ The extensive damage to homes and critical infrastructure, including roads, water systems, and electricity networks, is anticipated to significantly delay displaced populations' return to border villages. While some temporary returns have been recorded, these are mainly attributed to individual households returning to assess and safeguard their property.¹²

In January, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme published a series of Building Destruction And Debris Quantities assessments. In Bekaa Governorate, the assessment reported that 464 buildings were completely or partially destroyed. This figure accounts for 0.41% of the 113,387 buildings in the region before the war. The assessment also identified 1,359 units that were totally or partially destroyed. Of these, 798 were in the West Bekaa District, 103 in the Rachaiya District, and 458 in the Zahleh District. Additionally, 47 cadastres in the Bekaa Governorate experienced destruction, representing 32.6% of the 144 total cadastres in the area. Regarding debris, the estimated volume generated from the destroyed buildings was 223,173 cubic meters.

⁹ [Displacement Tracking Matrix MOBILITY SNAPSHOT – Round 75, February 2025 | IOM](#)

¹⁰ [From Crisis to Recovery: Local Authorities Confronting Post-War Realities in Lebanon Rapid Impact Assessment, January 2025 | UNDP](#)

¹¹ [Lebanon: Flash Update #55 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 16 January 2025 | OCHA](#)

¹² [Lebanon: Flash Update #56 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 23 January 2025 | OCHA](#)

The distribution of debris by the district is as follows: West Bekaa District accounted for 18,531 cubic meters, Zahleh District produced 141,439 cubic meters of debris, and Rachaiya District generated 63,203 cubic meters.¹³

In the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, the assessment revealed that 566 buildings were totally or partially destroyed, which is 0.44% of the 130,114 buildings in the region before the war. The assessment also identified 1,081 destroyed units: 990 in Baalbek District and 91 in Hermel District. Additionally, 55 cadastres in the governorate were affected by destruction, accounting for 57.3% of the 96 total cadastres in Baalbek-Hermel. The debris generated from the destroyed buildings amounted to a total volume of 199,347 cubic meters. The distribution by district shows that Baalbek District contributed 183,651 cubic meters of debris, and Hermel District produced 15,697 cubic meters.¹⁴

In the South and Nabatiyeh Governorates, the assessment found that 18,507 buildings were totally or partially destroyed, which accounts for 8% of the 237,425 buildings present before the conflict. 39,944 units were reported as totally or partially destroyed: 12,763 in the South Governorate and 27,181 in the Nabatiyeh Governorate. The assessment also indicates that the destruction affected 206 cadastres in these two governorates, representing 54.8% of the 376 total cadastres in the South and Nabatiyeh regions. The debris generated from the destroyed buildings amounted to a total volume of 6,192,740 cubic meters; in the South Governorate, the debris volume was 1,881,994 cubic meters, and in the Nabatiyeh Governorate, the debris volume was 4,310,746 cubic meters.¹⁵

UNHCR's January 2025 Refugee Perceptions and Intentions Survey conducted in Lebanon (among other countries) showed that around 80% of refugees now express a desire to return to Syria at some point. Additionally, 27% of Syrian refugees have stated an intention to return within the next 12 months. While some refugees are eager to return, many remain cautious, preferring to wait and see how the situation in Syria unfolds, or for the passage of events like the end of winter, Ramadan, agricultural seasons, or the school year. Major obstacles to returning include accumulated debts in host countries and damage to homes in Syria. For those who are considering a return, key concerns include accessing travel documents and border-crossing procedures.

¹³ [LEBANON – BUILDING DESTRUCTION AND DEBRIS QUANTITIES ASSESSMENT Bekaa Governorate, January 2025 | UNHSP](#)

¹⁴ [LEBANON – BUILDING DESTRUCTION AND DEBRIS QUANTITIES ASSESSMENT Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, January 2025 | UNHSP](#)

¹⁵ [LEBANON – BUILDING DESTRUCTION AND DEBRIS QUANTITIES ASSESSMENT South and Nabatiyeh Governorates, January 2025 | UNHSP](#)

Refugees have also expressed the need for transportation assistance, cash grants to cover basic needs, and support for rebuilding their homes and lives in Syria.¹⁶

Three official border crossings between Lebanon and Syria remain operational, with the Masnaa crossing in Bekaa serving as the sole entry point for vehicle traffic.¹⁷ Daily crossings at official border points remain low but steady, with an average of 1,000 to 1,500 crossings per day.¹⁸ As of February 4, the government's Disaster Risk Management reported around 94,000 arrivals from Syria into Baalbek Governorate, including 20,000 Lebanese returnees. Among them, approximately 36,500 people, primarily Syrians, are sheltering in 200 informal collective sites, while another 57,600 have settled within host communities. The numbers have increased since the last report due to escalating insecurity in Ghour, Homs Governorate, which has triggered further displacement.¹⁹

Economic Activity and Food Security

The attacks on Lebanon have damaged 14,748 business establishments, 26% of which were entirely demolished. The destruction also impacted 14,762 agricultural facilities—including poultry and livestock farms, fisheries, forests, farmland, and food production sites—19% of which were completely lost.²⁰ Retail food prices remain high following years of hyperinflation in Lebanon, with inflation remaining a significant driver of food insecurity. In November 2024, the annual food inflation rate stood at 23.2%. The monthly cost of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket increased by approximately 17% in December 2024 compared to the same month in 2023. The Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket cost reached 40.6 million Lebanese pounds (\$449) for a family of five, further diminishing households' purchasing power and exacerbating economic hardship.²¹

Between October and November 2024, approximately 1.59 million people in Lebanon faced severe food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher), representing 29% of the analyzed population. Among them, 205,000 individuals (4%) were in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), while 1.4 million (25%) were in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). The increase of over 300,000 people in acute food insecurity is primarily linked to war-related displacement and the continued economic downturn, particularly affecting trade and tourism. During this period, 928,000 Lebanese residents (24% of the population), 579,000 Syrian refugees (38% of the Syrian refugee population), and 84,000 Palestine refugees (40% of the

¹⁶ [Regional Flash Update #11. January 2025 | UNHCR](#)

¹⁷ [Regional Flash Update #10. January 2024 | UNHCR](#)

¹⁸ [Regional Flash Update #11. January 2025 | UNHCR](#)

¹⁹ [Regional Flash Update #13 Syria situation crisis 7 February 2025 | UNHCR](#)

²⁰ [From Crisis to Recovery: Local Authorities Confronting Post-War Realities in Lebanon Rapid Impact Assessment, January 2025 | UNDP](#)

²¹ [GIEWS - Global Information and Early Warning System, February 2025 | FAO](#)

Palestine refugee population) experienced high levels of food insecurity. The situation is expected to deteriorate between December 2024 and March 2025, with an estimated 1.65 million people (30%) likely to face IPC Phase 3 or higher. This includes 201,000 individuals (4%) in IPC Phase 4 and 1.45 million (26%) in IPC Phase 3. Projections indicate that 970,000 Lebanese residents (25%), 594,000 Syrian refugees (39%), and 89,000 Palestine refugees (40%) will experience severe food insecurity during this period.²²

Lebanon's winter cereal production for 2024 was estimated at 120,000 tonnes, marking a 34% decline compared to the five-year average. The planting of 2025 winter cereals was delayed until December 2024 due to ongoing hostilities restricting farmers' access to fields. Below-average rainfall in November and December 2024 in Baalbek-Hermel and the Bekaa Valley, combined with a forecast predicting drought conditions for February and March, is expected to reduce yields further. The ongoing economic crisis will also continue to affect the agricultural sector in 2025. Farmers face significant challenges with limited access to credit and an increasing reliance on cash payments, often in U.S. dollars. The high volatility of the exchange rate and price fluctuations for key agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and fuel—which are mainly imported—will likely drive up production costs, further straining the sector.²³

Health & Education

As of January 30, the Ministry of Health reported that the emergency response organizations recorded 237 attacks, resulting in 201 deaths and 253 injuries. A total of 67 emergency centers, 177 ambulances, 59 fire trucks, and 18 rescue vehicles were targeted. Hospitals also suffered significant damage, with 68 recorded attacks affecting 38 hospitals. Eight hospitals were forcibly shut down, while seven remained partially operational. Two hospitals remain forcibly closed. The attacks resulted in 16 deaths and 74 injuries, as well as damage to 25 hospital vehicles. Primary healthcare centers were also heavily impacted by the Israeli aggressions, with 63 attacks recorded. A total of 58 centers were forcibly closed, 10 were completely destroyed, and 50 sustained partial damage.²⁴

Since 2019, Lebanon's education sector has faced continuous crises, further straining a fragile system. Challenges include the Syrian crisis, the 2019 economic collapse, COVID-19, the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, and ongoing political instability. Even before the financial crisis, students effectively received only 6.3 years of education despite an

²² [IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS OCTOBER 2024 - MARCH 2025 Published on 17 January 2025 | IPC](#)

²³ [GIEWS - Global Information and Early Warning System, February 2025 | FAO](#)

²⁴ [Ministry of Health Releases Updated Cumulative Report on Enemy Attacks on the Health Sector, January 2025 | MoPH](#)

average school attendance of 10.2 years. In 2018, Lebanese students ranked among the lowest in reading performance in the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment's findings. Public schools have endured severe disruptions since 2019, with students receiving only 270 days of in-person instruction over four academic years, far below the standard 600 days. This has led to major learning losses, impacting future earning potential. The 2023 Israeli hostilities further disrupted education, increasing the need for remedial programs. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education reported that 10,000 public and 10,000 private school students were displaced in the 2023–24 academic year due to hostilities in the South. By September 2024, over 500,000 students and 45,000 teachers were directly affected. As a result of these hostilities, the public school year was delayed until November 4. More than 1,000 shelters were opened nationwide, with over 60% housed in public schools, TVET centers, and universities. Even after the ceasefire, returning to normal in-person learning will take time, especially in the most affected areas.²⁵

Anera's Response

Health

In response to the escalating health crisis during the war, Anera swiftly reprogrammed its existing projects to address urgent medical and mental health needs. Originally focused on rehabilitating the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) Al-Nassera Hospital in Bekaa, Anera redirected funds to procure emergency medications and critical medical supplies, ensuring immediate support for affected communities. Similarly, at the National Institute for Social Care and Vocational Training (NISCVT) in Tyre, Anera shifted its focus from infrastructure rehabilitation to supporting mental health services. This included covering consultation fees for psychiatrists, social workers, and speech therapists, as well as procuring essential mental health medications and supplies for their art and music therapy programs.

Additionally, Anera responded to the Ministry of Public Health's emergency appeal by procuring and delivering acute emergency medications to support overwhelmed healthcare facilities. In the South, where hospitals were directly impacted by the war, Anera provided vital medical supplies and first aid kits to first responders and frontline health workers, strengthening their ability to deliver lifesaving care amidst the crisis.

Food Security

As part of its emergency relief efforts during the recent war, and until January 30, 2025, Anera successfully secured funding from the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF) to

²⁵ [Pilot of a Teaching at the Right Level \(TaRL\)-Based Approach in Lebanon, January 2025 | World Bank](#)

deliver critical assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) affected by the war.

During the war, Anera distributed 10,500 hot meals to collective shelters in South Lebanon (Saida), providing displaced families with immediate nutrition. In hard-to-reach areas of Tyre, Anera delivered 1,000 ready-to-eat meals, ensuring vulnerable populations had access to food despite logistical challenges. After the war, Anera distributed 4,500 food parcels to returnees, IDPs, and Palestinian PWDs, supporting their reintegration into their communities.

Anera also partnered with the International Relief Team (IRT) to expand its emergency response efforts, ensuring broader assistance for those affected by the war. In food security efforts, Anera distributed 73,000 hot meals to IDPs in shelters during and after the war, sustaining displaced families with essential food provisions.

WASH

With funding from LHF, Anera distributed 4,500 menstrual hygiene management (MHM) kits after the war to returnees, IDPs, and Palestinian PWDs, helping them maintain dignity and proper hygiene. Anera also provided 1,500 hygiene kits to the same vulnerable groups, ensuring access to essential sanitation supplies to improve health and well-being. With support from IRT, Anera distributed 705 hygiene kits immediately after the war to returnees and IDPs, providing critical hygiene support.

Education & Livelihood

Between September and January 2025, Anera rapidly adapted its Education, Empowerment and Employability program to respond to the urgent needs of those displaced by the war in Lebanon. Recognizing the dual challenge of immediate survival and long-term resilience, Anera designed an integrated approach that combined short, skill-based training with cash-for-work opportunities. This initiative provided displaced youth (ages 18–25) with a pathway to contribute meaningfully to relief efforts while gaining essential skills for future employment.

To address emergency and recovery needs, Anera implemented six-day competency-based training courses, equipping youth—primarily internally displaced persons — with practical skills before engaging them in cash-for-work activities across critical sectors. In WASH, trainees tackled urgent community health concerns in shelters and settlements. Solar panel installation training provided sustainable energy solutions to mitigate power shortages in displacement shelters. Sewing training enabled youth to produce sleeping bags, blankets, and winter kits for IDPs. Cooking training supported meal preparation and delivery to shelters, ensuring food security. In

psychosocial support training, youth facilitated psychosocial support sessions and psychological first aid to assist displaced individuals.

Through the capacity development activities, the youth were able to contribute to Anera's relief efforts. Winterization efforts included the production and distribution of 4,003 sleeping bags and 10,754 winterization kits to IDPs in shelters. Food assistance involved preparing and distributing 34,141 hot meals for displaced families. To enhance employability, Anera conducted a vocational refresher course for 380 youth, combining three days of competency-based training with three days of adapted life skills training, while 1,100 youth participated in cash-for-work opportunities, contributing to emergency relief efforts while earning an income. In renewable energy, 20 youth engaged in cash-for-work activities to install solar energy systems in 14 technical and vocational education and training schools, addressing critical energy shortages. Additionally, Anera deployed mobile barber services with 30 trained youth, providing essential grooming to 9,083 displaced individuals across 256 shelters.

Through the competency-based training/cash-for-work model, over 1,000 youth were supported with training and employment opportunities, reducing the psychological burden of displacement while equipping them with essential skills for reintegration into the workforce.