



Lebanon Situation Report

April 18, 2025

Background

Anera's last [Situation Report \(February 2025\)](#) summarizes the situation immediately after the ceasefire announcement and ongoing tensions and hostilities.

Overview

Civilians across Lebanon remain heavily affected by ongoing military operations, which have intensified protection risks, obstructed the safe return of displaced individuals, disrupted humanitarian aid delivery, and increased overall needs. The Israeli army conducted daily artillery shelling and targeted strikes, particularly near the approximately 13 square kilometer area under its control. This zone is marked by a continued military presence, physical barriers, and warning signs advising Lebanese civilians to stay out.¹ The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, in her UN Security Council summary on March 17, noted that, although hostilities had formally ceased, military operations had not entirely stopped. The continued presence of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory, combined with ongoing strikes, posed a risk of destabilization along the Blue Line.² Israel and Lebanon have agreed to begin negotiations on unresolved issues tied to the cessation of hostilities agreement. Talks will focus primarily on the five locations in South Lebanon where Israeli forces remain present, as well as on disputed areas along the Blue Line.³

The World Bank's March 2025 Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment reveals that the destruction of physical assets has reached US\$6.8 billion, while the war has led to economic losses totaling US\$7.2 billion. **The overall requirements for recovery and reconstruction are estimated at US\$11 billion.** Housing has borne the brunt of the damage, incurring costs of US\$4.6 billion, which constitutes 67% of total physical destruction. Infrastructure sectors — including energy, municipal and public services, transport, water, wastewater, and irrigation — collectively represent 10% of the damages. Over a 26-month period, commerce, industry, and tourism experienced the most severe economic disruption, with losses valued at US\$3.4 billion, or 48% of the total, largely due to declines in business operations, tourism inflows, and domestic travel. Environmental degradation and debris accumulation follow, accounting for 11%

¹ [Lebanon: Flash Update #64 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 20 March 2025 | OCHA](#)

² [United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon briefs Security Council, March 2025 | OCHA](#)

³ [Lebanon: Flash Update #63 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 13 March 2025 | OCHA](#)

of the losses, largely due to adverse effects on rivers and coastal zones. The projected funding requirements include US\$8.4 billion for the immediate and short term (2025–2027) and US\$2.6 billion for the medium term (2028–2030). Housing again dominates with US\$6.3 billion in estimated needs, representing 57%, while commerce, industry, and tourism require US\$1.8 billion (17%). Infrastructure needs across the aforementioned sectors are projected at US\$1.0 billion, making up 9% of the total.⁴

Violence in Lebanon

Military activity escalated again in Lebanon during the reporting period (February 22 - April 18), marked by a renewed wave of airstrikes and shelling in regions still occupied by Israeli forces. On March 22, dozens of Israeli air raids struck locations across the South, as well as in Nabatieh, Baalbek-Hermel, and Baalbek governorates. On March 28, Israeli airstrikes launched a fresh wave of attacks on sites in the South, Nabatieh, and Bekaa governorates, as well as in the southern suburbs of Beirut — marking the first such strikes since the ceasefire began on November 27, 2024.⁵

On April 7, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) announced that a raid carried out by the Israeli forces using a drone on the Al-Dardara–Khayyam road resulted in the deaths of two Syrian nationals and the injury of one Lebanese citizen. A second raid by Israeli forces later that day on the town of Tayiba also left one civilian injured. On the same day, an Israeli drone strike targeting a vehicle in the town of Beit Lif resulted in the injury of a citizen.⁶ Additionally, an Israeli drone strike on the town of Tayiba killed another citizen.⁷ On April 4, A raid on an apartment in the city of Saida killed three individuals.⁸ On April 3, the Israeli airstrike on a vehicle on the road to Bint Jbeil resulted in the injury of two citizens.⁹ On March 27, an Israeli airstrike on a vehicle in Yahr al-Shuqayf killed three individuals.¹⁰

On March 22, the MoPH reported that a series of airstrikes carried out by the Israeli forces on several areas in Lebanon resulted in the deaths of seven individuals and left forty others injured.¹¹ On March 17, MoPH announced that clashes over the previous two days along the Lebanese-Syrian border resulted in the death of seven civilians and injuries to fifty-two others.

⁴ [LEBANON RAPID DAMAGE AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT \(RDNA\) MARCH 2025 | World Bank](#)

⁵ [Lebanon: Flash Update #65 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 28 March 2025 | OCHA](#)

⁶ [MoPH | Facebook](#)

⁷ [MoPH | Facebook](#)

⁸ [MoPH | Facebook](#)

⁹ [MoPH | Facebook](#)

¹⁰ [MoPH | Facebook](#)

¹¹ [Seven martyrs and forty wounded in Israeli raids on Lebanese areas today, March 2025 | MoPH](#)

Shelter & Displacement

Displacement levels remain high in Lebanon, with many people still unable to return to their areas of origin. The Israeli army is preventing the return of civilians in the area it occupies. Several villages within this zone have been partially or completely destroyed, making conditions unsafe for displaced populations. **The Israeli army maintains control over five key positions and, according to media reports, is enforcing four designated buffer zones along the Blue Line inside Lebanese territory, where a Lebanese presence is reportedly prohibited.**¹² The Israeli army continues to occupy and restrict access to approximately 13 square kilometers on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line. Villages within this zone experience heightened insecurity, as ongoing military operations disrupt daily life and prolong displacement in and around the area. On March 28, the Israeli army issued its first displacement order since the ceasefire began, directed at the targeted location in Hadath, located in Beirut's southern suburbs.¹³

As of March 26, Lebanon recorded **93,306 internally displaced persons (IDPs)**. Displacement spans 24 districts across all eight governorates, with 75% of IDPs located in Sour, El Nabatieh, Saida, Aley, and Bent Jbeil. Most IDPs (93%) come from five districts, primarily Bent Jbeil (48%). About 42% of displacement occurred across governorate lines. In El Nabatieh, over half the IDPs fled to other governorates, while most from South and Mount Lebanon remained within their regions. A total of 965,360 IDPs have returned, mainly to El Nabatieh (27%), Sour (21%), and Saida (17%). The majority (86%) were originally displaced from Beirut, Chouf, Saida, Baalbek, and Zahle. Most returns (74%) were cross-governorate. Currently, 70% of IDPs rent housing, 25% live in host settings, 3% in secondary homes, and 2% in collective shelters. Of those in host settings, 44% live in overcrowded conditions.¹⁴

The IDPs Return Intention Survey produced by the UN International Organization for Migration showed that displacement decisions were primarily influenced by proximity to family and friends (43%), availability of better housing options (20%), and perceptions of safety (19%). These factors shaped where individuals chose to relocate during the war. Regarding return intentions, a majority of displaced households (62%) expressed plans to stay in their current locations for at least the next 30 days while monitoring the security situation. Additionally, 17% intend to remain indefinitely, while only 11% plan to return to their areas of origin within that time frame. Over the next three months, 48% still plan to stay, though 28% expressed intent to return home. These trends suggest that **unless there is a significant improvement in**

¹² [Lebanon: Flash Update #62 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 6 March 2025 | OCHA](#)

¹³ [Lebanon: Flash Update #65 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 28 March 2025 | OCHA](#)

¹⁴ [Displacement Tracking Matrix MOBILITY SNAPSHOT – Round 82 | IOM](#)

conditions, many displaced families are likely to remain in their current locations. Rent varies by region, with the highest average in Beirut at \$424 per month and the lowest in Baalbek-El Hermel at \$200. Housing is frequently shared, with IDPs cohabiting with an average of 1.6 families per unit, comprising roughly 5.5 individuals. **Barriers to return remain significant.** Nearly half (47%) reported their homes or belongings were lost or damaged, and 32% cited safety concerns in their places of origin. Furthermore, 30% said they lack the financial resources needed to return, while 49% require financial or material support for housing rehabilitation.¹⁵

A UNHCR survey found that following the war, 21% of Lebanese IDPs and 35% of Syrian refugees remain displaced. Lebanese IDPs are often unable to return due to damaged or unsafe homes, leaving many in temporary or shared shelters. For Syrians, return has been blocked by restrictions in 27 municipalities, especially in the South, where some landlords have refused re-entry or sold off tenants' belongings. While a few have made short visits, many Syrian refugees remain displaced despite a strong desire to return to their original communities. In the Bekaa and South, participants reported difficulties in accessing water. In Kfar Denis, Lebanese respondents stated they rely on water trucking, costing \$40 per month. Both areas of displacement and origin have seen significant increases in commodity and rental prices. Families struggle with the high cost of housing, as rental prices have surged, particularly after the announcement of \$500/month rent assistance in Beirut/Mount Lebanon. Landlords often demand several months' rent upfront, and many IDPs are forced to share living spaces to reduce accommodation costs. In southern Lebanon, IDP returnees face a shortage of vacant homes due to the extensive damage from airstrikes. Even areas not directly impacted by the conflict have become overcrowded by hosting large numbers of displaced people, straining housing availability and basic services.¹⁶

UN Habitat released updated findings from their remote damage assessment covering the period from September 2023 to December 2024. The survey focused on the South and Nabatieh governorates, with additional assessments completed in Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel. South and Nabatieh were the most severely affected, with 18,507 buildings either partially or completely destroyed — representing around 8% of all pre-war structures in those areas. **Marjaayoun district suffered the greatest impact, with over 27% of its buildings damaged or destroyed, followed by Bint Jbeil at nearly 15%.** In comparison, Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel recorded 464 and 566 damaged or destroyed buildings, respectively. The total volume of debris generated between September 2023 and December 2024 is estimated to be between 11 and 15 million tonnes.¹⁷

¹⁵ [IOM Lebanon - IDPs Return Intention Survey, March 2025 | IOM](#)

¹⁶ [Lebanon: UNHCR - Protection Monitoring Findings - December 2024 | UNHCR](#)

¹⁷ [Lebanon: Flash Update #58 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 06 February 2025 | OCHA](#)

As of March 27, 2025, UNHCR reports that an estimated **371,900 Syrians have returned to Syria from neighboring countries since December 8, 2024**. This figure brings the total number of returnees since the start of 2024 to 732,700 individuals; the majority of these movements are occurring from Lebanon. At the same time, some Syrians are fleeing into Lebanon. Hostilities erupting in early March across Syria's Tartous, Latakia, Homs, and Hama governorates have triggered **ongoing displacement into northern Lebanon**, particularly affecting the North and Akkar governorates. By March 20, official data from Lebanon's Disaster Risk Management indicates that Akkar had received 14,108 individuals, amounting to 3,126 families, now spread across 27 locations — mainly concentrated in 24 villages near the Syrian border. In the North governorate, the Lebanese Red Cross conducted a detailed enumeration, recording 7,529 individuals (1,760 families), consisting of 1,567 Syrian and 193 Lebanese families. The majority of these displaced families have settled in Tripoli's Jabal Mohsen area (1,447 families) and in Dhour el Hawa, North Lebanon (256 families).¹⁸

Economic Activity and Food Security

According to the World Bank assessment, out of the US\$11 billion required for recovery, a major share — between US\$6 and 8 billion — is expected to come from private sector investment, particularly within the housing and the commerce, industry, and tourism sectors. To mobilize this level of private capital, substantial public sector involvement will be necessary through supportive policies, improvements to the investment climate, banking reforms, and possibly financial tools such as guarantees. Additionally, public funding of approximately US\$3 to 5 billion will be essential to finance key areas such as infrastructure, agriculture, environmental recovery, and human development services like education and healthcare. Regionally, the Nabatiyeh governorate has sustained the most severe impact, accounting for US\$3.2 billion in damages (47%), US\$2 billion in losses (28%), and US\$4.7 billion in recovery needs (43%). The South governorate follows, with each category representing 22 to 23% of the total. Mount Lebanon, which encompasses parts of Beirut's southern outskirts, has also been significantly affected, representing 16% of overall needs. Baalbek-Hermel and Bekaa contribute 7% and 6%, respectively. The World Bank assessment indicates that Lebanon's real GDP is projected to shrink by 7% in 2024. When compared to the previously anticipated 1% growth in a no-conflict scenario, the conflict's economic toll amounts to an 8% reduction in GDP, with cumulative GDP losses since 2019 nearing 40% by the end of 2024.¹⁹

According to a UNHCR survey conducted in late November and early December, displaced people reported ongoing financial challenges in both pre- and post-conflict areas, such as struggling to afford essential commodities like food, water, heating fuel,

¹⁸ [New Arrivals to North Lebanon 17 March 2025 | UNHCR](#)

¹⁹ [LEBANON RAPID DAMAGE AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT \(RDNA\) MARCH 2025 | World Bank](#)

and healthcare. **Syrian respondents particularly mentioned unequal access to aid, such as food assistance and shelter**, and many had to cut spending, including on food. Additionally, many Syrians take multiple low-paying jobs to make ends meet, and there is widespread sharing of living spaces to alleviate rental costs.²⁰

UNICEF reported that the war exacerbated food insecurity, especially in Baalbeck-Hermel and Bekaa. In Baalbeck-Hermel, 51% of children under two are in severe food poverty (defined as consuming two or fewer of eight key food groups). In Bekaa, the rate is 45%, up from 28% in 2023. Nearly half of the children in Bekaa (49%) and over a third in Baalbeck-Hermel (34%) had one or no meals the day before the survey. Nationally, this applies to 30% of children.²¹

Health & Education

On April 4, MoPH condemned the targeting of two ambulances and a fire truck, as well as the destruction of a temporary health center operated by the Health Authority in Naqoura.²² On February 16, MoPH strongly condemned the abduction of two paramedics affiliated with the Islamic Risala Scouts by Israeli forces. The paramedics were taken to an unknown location while carrying out their humanitarian duty of evacuating the wounded from the town of Houla.²³

According to the Health Sector, hundreds of thousands returning to conflict-affected areas are exposed to serious risks, including unexploded ordnance, unstable structures, human remains, and damaged water and sanitation systems — all of which heighten the threat of communicable disease outbreaks. Although most health facilities have resumed operations following the ceasefire, three hospitals and 26 primary health care centres (PHCCs) remain closed. In total, **98 PHCCs were completely destroyed, while 51 sustained partial damage** and could potentially reopen after urgent repairs and re-equipping.²⁴

A January 2025 UNICEF survey found that 72% of caregivers observed anxiety or nervousness in their children during the war, while 62% noted signs of depression. Though 80% of caregivers reported some mental health improvement post-ceasefire, prolonged trauma continues to pose serious risks. The education system, already strained by economic crises and COVID-19, suffered further during the war. **Over**

²⁰ [Lebanon: UNHCR - Protection Monitoring Findings - December 2024 | UNHCR](#)

²¹ [Decline in children's mental health, nutrition and education after the war in Lebanon: UNICEF | UNICEF](#)

²² [The Ministry of Health condemns the targeting of ambulances in Naqoura: a repeated and serious violation of international and humanitarian laws, April 2025 | MoPH](#)

²³ [Statement of condemnation from the Ministry of Public Health regarding the kidnapping of Islamic Message Scouts paramedics in Houla, February 2025 | MoPH](#)

²⁴ [Lebanon: Flash Update #58 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 06 February 2025 | OCHA](#)

500,000 children were already out of school before the conflict. Damage to school infrastructure and the use of schools as shelters for the 1.3 million IDPs compounded the problem. While attendance has improved since the ceasefire, **25% of children remain out of school**, down from 65% during the war. **Financial barriers — such as school fees and transport costs — were cited by two-thirds of affected families**, double the rate from 2023, where 45% of families reduced health spending, 33% couldn't access essential medications for their children, 30% cut education costs, 31% lacked sufficient drinking water, and 22% had no heating source for the winter.²⁵

A UNHCR survey found that participants reported widespread psychosocial distress due to conflict, displacement, and ongoing uncertainty. This affected all groups — Syrians and Lebanese, men and women, adults and children. The situation was especially severe in the South and among Syrians, where discrimination added to the stress. Respondents in the South described sleep difficulties, social withdrawal, and increased aggressive behavior in children. In Beirut and Mount Lebanon, IDPs reported emotional strain linked to the post-conflict environment, with children experiencing separation anxiety. **Across all areas, both Syrian and Lebanese IDPs struggled to cope with the lasting psychological impact of the war.** Participants highlighted the high cost of medication and limited access to affordable healthcare in both displacement and return areas, with those suffering from chronic illnesses facing even greater hardship due to ongoing medical expenses. Access to education was another major concern. Many reported that children missed out on schooling during displacement and after returning home.²⁶

According to UNHCR's first IDPs Protection Monitoring Update, IDPs, particularly women and girls, reported feeling unsafe outside their homes, with increased cases of gender-based violence, family conflict, and child abuse linked to overcrowded, inadequate shelters. Both Lebanese and Syrian IDPs noted heightened anxiety in children post-conflict, with many staying close to their mothers for reassurance. Key informants stressed the need for child protection services, parenting education, awareness on child safety, and PSEA initiatives. In the South, Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates, child labor — especially among Syrians — was reported to help cover basic needs. Family separation was also noted, with some Syrian men sending their families back to Syria during airstrikes while they remained in Lebanon.²⁷

On 28 March, the Israeli army issued a displacement order in Hadath, located in Beirut's southern suburbs. Its closeness to two nearby schools reportedly sparked panic

²⁵ [Decline in children's mental health, nutrition and education after the war in Lebanon: UNICEF | UNICEF](#)

²⁶ [Lebanon: UNHCR - Protection Monitoring Findings - December 2024 | UNHCR](#)

²⁷ [Lebanon: UNHCR - Protection Monitoring Findings - December 2024 | UNHCR](#)

among residents. In response, the Ministry of Education closed public schools in the southern suburbs, while numerous schools throughout South Lebanon also suspended classes on March 27 as airstrikes began.²⁸

Anera's Response

Health/Product Donations

Anera is implementing the [Cystic Fibrosis Rare Disease Program](#) — Lebanon's first long-term cystic fibrosis treatment initiative — in partnership with the American University of Beirut Medical Center and Direct Relief. This groundbreaking program now provides 72 eligible patients with access to Trikafta, a transformative medication that **significantly improves the quality of life for many individuals with cystic fibrosis**. In March 2025, a second medication shipment arrived, valued at \$13.3 million and covering a six-month supply, marking another milestone in sustaining this critical care.

In partnership with Distribute Aid, Anera responded to a special request from the Health Care Society by providing a **seated scale for dialysis patients** at Safad Hospital, greatly enhancing care for bedridden individuals. This shipment included over 200 disability support items, addressing critical needs across multiple facilities. Additionally, the shipment fulfilled Machghara Hospital's urgent request for two emergency stretchers, significantly strengthening its emergency response capacity in a designated red zone.

Anera also delivered a full container of Aspirin Protect, providing critical cardiovascular support across Lebanon. This shipment covered the annual needs of 13,000 patients at risk of heart attacks and strokes, ensuring uninterrupted access to essential preventive care through providing over 159,000 packs.

In response to an urgent request from the Ministry of Public Health, Anera procured 2,000 packs of life-saving **iron chelation therapy for thalassemia patients**, addressing a critical shortage of this essential medication. Sourced internationally through Novartis, the shipment provides a three-month supply for patients who were previously at high risk due to the drug's unavailability in local markets. Distribution began in early April, offering timely relief to individuals reliant on this treatment to manage iron overload and prevent serious complications.

Food Security

During the Ramadan response, **Anera supported 9,094 households with food parcel distributions** across Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Akkar, and the Bekaa, helping to

²⁸ [Lebanon: Flash Update #65 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 28 March 2025 | OCHA](#)

alleviate food insecurity during the holy month. In parallel, over 1,000 children—including many from vulnerable backgrounds—were reached with community iftars, delivered in collaboration with four local partners.

As part of the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund-funded emergency response, Anera distributed **952 food parcels** in the Tyre area to support returnee families affected by the conflict. The intervention reached a total of 4,760 individuals, helping to address immediate food insecurity and stabilize nutritional access for vulnerable households in the aftermath of displacement.

As part of the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund-funded **cash assistance** project, Anera supported 2,250 vulnerable individuals—including 1,950 Lebanese and 300 Palestinian beneficiaries—helping them meet their essential needs during a time of severe economic hardship.

Agriculture

Anera re-launched its agriculture strategy in February 2025, introducing an updated farm-to-market strategy tailored to the realities of the post-war context. This revised approach **integrates food production with market access, tackling both food insecurity and economic vulnerability**. By building on existing agricultural efforts, the model strengthens value chains through structured aggregation and closer linkages with the private sector. Since the relaunch, Anera has made notable strides: in Beddawi camp, 15 **rooftop gardens** have been installed, bringing food production directly into homes. In Akkar, 10 **greenhouses** have been installed or rehabilitated, with improved irrigation systems boosting productivity and climate resilience. **Training and capacity-building activities** have reached all 15 rooftop garden households in Beddawi and 10 farmers in Akkar, while distributions of agricultural inputs have helped scale cultivation efforts. Meanwhile, ten private sector visits were conducted across the North and South to explore market linkages and strengthen the sales pipeline for farmers. In parallel, Anera launched damage assessments in conflict-affected areas to better understand the war's impact on greenhouses and agricultural inputs — findings that will shape future interventions focused on recovery and restoring productive capacity in Lebanon's agriculture sector.

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Following the ceasefire, Anera swiftly mobilized resources to **rehabilitate critical water infrastructure** in conflict-affected villages, ensuring the restoration of safe water access for returning communities. In Borj Rahhal, Anera repaired the village's solar energy systems, including the replacement of damaged solar panels and full site restoration. This intervention successfully reactivated two out of three key water wells,

which are vital sources of drinking water for the local population. In Baraachit, Anera rehabilitated two large water tanks with a combined capacity of 132,000 gallons and carried out extensive repairs and installations of internal water pipelines. These upgrades reconnected households previously cut off from the water network, providing reliable daily access to safe water for approximately 700 families.